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Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper puts forth a functionalist difficulty for Sally 
Haslanger’s proposal for engineering our concept of ‘woman.’ It 
is argued that the project of bringing about better political 
function fulfillment cannot get off the ground in virtue of 
epistemic failure. 
 
Keywords: conceptual engineering, epistemic failure, representational function, 
gender, race. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Say that we wanted better ways of thinking about the world: could we replace our 
defective representational devices with better ones? Should we? Is this what 
philosophy is/should be all about? According to optimists about the conceptual 
engineering project,1  the answer to all these questions is ‘yes’. We should 
manufacture better concepts for ourselves: semantically better, epistemically 
better, and importantly, morally, socially and politically better. 
 Sally Haslanger is a notable optimist. According to her, we should look 
into the function of our concepts, and engineer them accordingly, i.e. so that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g. Cappelen, H. Fixing Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018); Sharp, K. Replacing Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 
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serve the relevant function well/better. According to Haslanger, our concept of 
‘woman’ is one such concept, in need of work; the concept in use carries 
politically problematic connotations: historically, it came to be associated with 
social and political subordination. Haslanger proposes to engineer ‘woman’ such 
as to bring these connotations into clear view. The final political goal of this move 
is the elimination of women: ’[...] I believe it is part of the project of feminism to 
bring about a day when there are no more women.’2  
 This paper puts forth a functionalist worry for Haslanger’s project; more 
precisely, according to the view defended here, due to the epistemic normative 
specifics of the concept and its use, engineering ‘woman’ for political reasons, to 
the detriment of epistemic representational considerations, can’t get off the 
ground. 
 In order to do this, I will first give a brief overview of Haslanger’s 
proposal (#2). Second, I will look at the normative limitations of her functionalist 
conceptual engineering project (#3). Last but not least, I will voice the main worry 
of this paper and consider and dismiss a possible avenue for rescuing the 
Haslanger project. 
 
 
2. Engineering ‘Woman’ 
 
Haslanger’s engineering project is a function-first project: the thought is that, 
instead of trying to analyze our concepts, we, philosophers, should rather ask 
ourselves: ‘what functions do these concepts fulfill for us?’ and craft better 
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  Haslanger, S. “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to 
be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 46.	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concepts accordingly, i.e., remodel our representational devices so as to better 
fulfill said functions: 
 
[…W]e begin by considering more fully the pragmatics of our talk 
employing the terms in question. What is the point of having these 
concepts? What cognitive or practical task do they (or should they) 
enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our 
(legitimate) purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these 
purposes better?3 
 
In the case of gender and race concepts, according to Haslanger, we should be 
focusing on two important functions of these concepts - one epistemic function, 
pertaining to fruitfulness in critical feminist/race inquiry, and, relatedly, the 
political function, concerning social dynamics they serve – and craft more useful 
concepts, accordingly. That is not to say that the representational function of these 
concepts is to be disregarded: rather, questions pertaining to their extension will 
only inform the project rather than act as an overriding consideration: 
 
[C]onsider what work we want these concepts to do for us; why do we need 
them at all? The responsibility is ours to define them for our purposes. In 
doing so we will want to be responsive to some aspects of ordinary usage - 
and to aspects of both the connotation and extension of the terms. However, 
neither ordinary usage nor empirical investigation is overriding, […] the 
world by itself can't tell us what gender is, or what race is; it is up to us to 
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  Haslanger, S. “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to 
be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 33.	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decide what in the world, if anything, they are.4 
 
 Haslanger further proposes that we explicitly include the hierarchical 
social connotations in our gender concepts. Accordingly, on her view, we should 
revise our concept of woman as follows: 
 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimension - 
economic, political, legal, social, etc. and S is marked as a target for this treatment 
by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's 
biological role in reproduction.5 
 
 Bringing the implicit hierarchical connotations carried by gender concepts 
at center stage is thought to result in both epistemic and political gain. 
Epistemically, Haslanger argues, feminist critical theory stands to gain from 
sharply identifying the target of its inquiry: women as subordinate social entities. 
Politically, the ambition is that, once negative connotations are made explicit, in 
time, we will ‘get rid of women:’ “I’m asking us to understand ourselves and 
those around us as deeply molded by injustice and to draw the appropriate 
prescriptive inference. This, I hope, will contribute to empowering critical social 
agents”.6 
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be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 33.	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  Haslanger, S. “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to 
be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 39.	  6	  Haslanger, S. “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to 
be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 39.	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3. Functions, Norms and Goods 
 
This section argue that the representational function of the concept of ‘woman’, in 
virtue of being its main function, will, contra Haslanger, override considerations 
pertaining to fruitfulness in feminist inquiry and political benefits. If that is the 
case, the project will have difficulties getting of the ground. 
 To see this, note that concepts, much like beliefs, are representational 
devices, their main function is an epistemic one: the main function of our concept 
of ‘chair’ is to pick out chairs. Our concepts are mainly there to help us come 
know the world around us. Compatibly with this, concepts may, and very 
plausibly often do, serve a variety of different functions, be they non-
representational epistemic functions, or functions of more practical sort, such as 
moral, social or political functions.  
 Representational devices are hardly isolated among functional items in 
virtue of their multi-functionality: take the heart. Plausibly, its main function is 
pumping blood in the circulatory system. It’s a biological function. Compatibly 
with this, though, the heart also serves an epistemic function of informing us with 
regard to the general health of the cardio-vascular system. It serves this function 
in two ways: at a more rudimentary level, it does so by making a ticking sound. 
At a more scientific level, it does so by drawing EKG charts.   
 When all goes well, functional traits reliably enough fulfill their main 
function by functioning normally in normal conditions.7 When all goes well, your 
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heart will reliably pump blood in your circulatory system by ticking, in normal 
conditions (e.g., when in the chest, when connected to the circulatory system etc; 
in what follows, I will take the ‘normal conditions’ proviso as read). A properly 
functioning heart will be a heart that’s ticking. Proper functioning for hearts is 
defined in terms of its main function of pumping blood. Conversely, a heart that 
fails to function properly will be malfunctioning.  
 Note, importantly, that your heart will count as malfunctioning even if, 
while not functioning normally when it comes to fulfilling its main biological 
function of pumping blood – not ticking - it does, nevertheless, reliably fulfill its 
secondary, epistemic function: a heart that fails to pump blood but keeps drawing 
charts on EKGs is still a malfunctioning heart. In fact, we come to know it is 
malfunctioning by means of the EKG reading.  
 This is due to the fact that secondary functions normatively ‘ride’ on main 
functions: functional items have secondary functions in virtue of their main 
function, as it were. The heart only has the epistemic function it has to begin with 
– the function of drawing EKG charts – in virtue of having its main biological 
function of pumping blood.  
 Consider, also, artifacts: take knives. The main function of knives is to cut. 
As such, a properly functioning knife is a sharp knife: a knife that, in normal 
conditions, reliably fulfills its function: it cuts. Compatibly with that, knifes can 
fulfill aesthetic functions, for instance: they can be particularly pretty, displayed 
in museums etc. Note, though, that a blunt but pretty knife is still a 
malfunctioning knife, in virtue of failing to reliably enough fulfill its main 
function when in normal conditions. This is because its secondary, aesthetic 
function normatively ‘rides’ on its primary function - cutting. 	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 Representational devices follow suit; take beliefs: when properly 
functioning, beliefs reliably represent the world in normal conditions. Beliefs, of 
course, can, and plausibly do, have a variety of secondary functions too. One 
important such function is practical, or biological: helping us survive. Now, these 
two functions usually work hand in hand: my beliefs about food and predators 
accurately represent the world, and thereby I stay alive. This need not be the case, 
though: there are cases where irrational optimism is best for staying alive. In such 
cases, false beliefs about, for instance, one’s state of health, are good for survival: 
they serve beliefs’ biological function well. Nevertheless, practical reasons are not 
good reasons for belief: wishful thinking is bad believing. In an important sense, 
if I believe that Berlin is the capital of France because you offered me a large sum 
of money to do so, my belief forming capacities are not properly functioning. The 
reason for this, again, is because the secondary, biological function of belief 
normatively ‘rides’ on its primary, epistemic function: belief is supposed to insure 
survival by proper representation. In fact, the only reason why wishful thinking 
‘works’ to begin with is because it mimics epistemically proper believing: it 
‘pretends,’ as it were, to tell the truth. 
 In line with other functional devices, then, in virtue of their main, 
representational epistemic function, concepts will be properly functioning when 
responsive to epistemic reasons pertaining to properly representing the world, and 
malfunctioning when merely responsive to other types – practical, moral, political 
- reasons. Concepts will function properly when they will reliably pick out what 
they are meant to pick out in the world. The concept of ‘chair’ will function well 
when it will reliably pick out chairs. Conversely, if it fails to do so, no matter 
what practical, moral, esthetic etc. benefits it brings, the concept ‘chair’ is 
malfunctioning. 
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 Also, function talk is value charged: there is a sense in which a 
malfunctioning functional trait is a bad trait of its kind. To put the distinction that 
concerns us in value-theoretic terms, there is such a thing as attributive goodness,8 
and then there is such a thing as ‘goodness for.’ A heart is a good heart 
(attributively, that is, a good token of its type) when it functions properly, i.e. 
when it pumps blood in your circulatory system by ticking. Compatibly with that, 
a bad heart (i.e., a bad token of its type) can be good for a variety of things: in the 
example above, the bad heart is good for epistemic tasks: it draws charts on the 
EKG, thereby informing your doctor of the state of your health.  
 Similarly, a good knife is a sharp knife, and a good belief is a true (or 
knowledgeable) belief; all this, independently of what other secondary functions 
bad hearts, knifes and beliefs might serve. Last but not least, concepts will be 
good concepts qua concepts when they are representationally, epistemically good. 
A concept that fails representationally will be a bad concept. 
  
 
4. The Worry 
 
To see why all the above constitutes a problem for Haslanger’s project, note that, 
plausibly enough, not all women fit the proposed definition of the concept 
‘woman.’ Not all women, that is, are systematically subordinated along some 
dimension - economic, political, legal, social, etc. - and marked as a target for this 
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a 
female's biological role in reproduction. Some women are lucky. Also, 
fortunately, as generations pass, subordination happens less and less at systemic 	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  Geach, P. “Good and evil,” Analysis, 17 (1956): 33–42.	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level. Or, to say the least, claiming that all women fall under this definition would 
surely be a fairly bold empirical claim to make.  
 If that is the case, though, it seems to follow that the newly refurbished 
concept Haslanger proposes will likely fail to serve its representational epistemic 
function: it will fail to pick out a number of, well, intuitively, women. Lucky 
women will not be women if this engineering project goes through. 
 Haslanger is well aware of this worry, and happy to endorse the 
consequences: 
 
I'm happy to admit that there could be females who aren't women in the 
sense I've defined, but these individuals […] are not counterexamples to the 
analysis. The analysis is intended to capture a meaningful political category 
for critical feminist efforts, and non-oppressed females do not fall within 
that category - though they may be interesting for other reasons! […] On the 
account I've offered, it is true that certain females don't count as ªrealº 
women; choose what facts are significant on the basis of explicit and 
considered values. [But f]or the purposes of a critical feminist inquiry, 
oppression is a significant fact around which we should organize our 
theoretical categories.9 
 
 The thought, then, is that, even though we loose representationally, we 
gain in two other, more important ways: first, from an epistemic perspective, the 
Haslanger ‘woman’ is more useful for our feminist inquiry. Secondly, politically 
speaking, by raising awareness, it is more likely to help in bringing about a world 
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  Haslanger, S. “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to 
be?” Noûs 34 (1) (2000): 46.	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without ‘women’ in the Haslanger sense. 
 By now, one problem with this view should have become clear: whatever 
other functions the concept of ‘woman’ might serve – epistemic, moral, social, 
political etc. -, its main function, like with any representational device is to 
represent the world. The main function of ‘woman’ is to pick out women.  
 In line with all functional items, a concept of ‘woman’ that fails to fulfill 
its main, epistemic representational function reliably is malfunctioning. 
Furthermore, in virtue of being malfunctioning, it is not a good concept qua 
concept – i.e., a good token of its type. If Haslanger’s ‘woman’ fails to be a good 
concept qua concept, plausibly, it will not be a better concept than its predecessor. 
If so, Haslanger’s project will fail to qualify as an ameliorative project: it will not 
have engineered better ways for us to think about the world. 
 Furthermore, note that any other functions the concept of ‘woman’ might 
have normatively ride on its main function: the only reason why the concept of 
‘woman’ has any political significance, to begin with, is because it picks out 
women reliably. Were it to fail to do so, it would likely also fail to have much in 
the way of political impact. If that is the case, Haslanger is wrong to think that we 
are free to revise our concept as we please, for political gain: the concept’s 
political function rides on its epistemic, representational good functioning.  
Contra Haslanger, questions pertaining to the concept’s extension will not merely 
inform the engineering project, they need to act as an overriding consideration. If 
one engineers ‘woman’ for political gain, and thereby the concept loses its 
representational epistemic function, it also looses its political significance.  
 One way to protect the Haslanger project from this worry would be to go 
context-bound: it is not fair play, the defender of the Haslanger view could argue, 
to ask whether we should take on a new concept, and for what reasons, without 
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specifying what use-context we’re asking about. Take ‘chair’ again: if the context 
of interest is related to home furniture, then it might be quite obvious that 
representational epistemic goals take primacy. If it’s policy making, then it might 
be equally obvious that practical goals take primacy: if we can save a small 
country by calling tables chairs for the purpose of policy making, we should 
definitely do so. It need not be that if we change concepts in one context, then we 
have to change them in all others:  
 The problem with going contextualist, however, is that it is not clear that 
the worry does not reappear at the level of a particular context. Think back to the 
(arguably) parallel case of belief:  it might be that, for the purposes of one context 
or another, it is better to believe what one is prudentially justified to believe. For 
instance, in the case of patients with very serious conditions, there is empirical 
research strongly suggesting that wishful thinking can prolong life expectancy. 
Still, there remains an intuitively important sense in which beliefs formed as a 
result of wishful thinking are defective beliefs. The functionalist picture serves to 
explain this. Similarly, it is not clear that using ‘chair’ to talk about tables will be 
a proper, non-defective way to refer, rather than a defective but useful way. To 
see the plausibility of the latter, think of failed attempts at semantic engineering in 
totalitarian regimes: the people of Turkmenistan might reliably call the forth 
month of the year by the dictator’s mother’s name, on pain of imprisonment, in all 
official contexts. This, however, fails to qualify as successful engineering for the 
concept of April.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
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I have argued on functionalist grounds that the project of engineering ‘woman’ 
such as to include a subordinate status in its definition will have difficulties 
getting of the ground due to epistemic failure. The main function of the concept of 
‘woman’ is to pick out women. If it fails to do so, it will also fail to better fulfill 
its secondary functions, whatever they may be. 
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